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INTRODUCTION
During automated business transactions, one of the nontrivial securityservices to be established by a security system is the trust betweenthe participating users. This is also called authentication of users.
Trust can be realized by means of a Public Key Infrastructure(PKI). The
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is a set of hardware, software, people,
policies, and procedures needed to create, manage, store, distribute, and
revoke digital certificates(Mazaher and Roe, 2003). Digital certificates have
become an accepted method for securely binding the identity of an
individual or a device to a public key, in order to support public key
cryptographic operations such as   digital signature verification and public
key-based encryption. Digital signatures play an essential role for security
on the Internet.
PUBLIC KEY CRYPTOGRAPHY
Public key cryptography supports security mechanisms such as
confidentiality, integrity, authentication, and non-repudiation. In order to
successfully implement these security mechanisms, one must carefully plan
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an infrastructure to manage them. A Public Key Infrastructure is a
foundation on which other applications, system, and network security
components are built. Interoperability is a major issue in Public Key
Infrastructures. There are three families of public key cryptography in
common use today(Zuccherato, 2003). Firstly, the systems based on integer
factorization. RSA cryptographic system is the most popular public key
cryptographic system under this family. Secondly the systems based on
the discrete logarithm problem(Thales, 2000). These algorithms can provide
support for both digital signatures(Cronin et al., 2003) (DSA) and key
agreement(Diffie-Hellman). Thirdly, the system based on arithmetic using
elliptic curves (Thales, 2000). Elliptic Curve Cryptography is a relatively
new family of public key algorithms under this family that can provide
shorter key lengths and depending on the environment and application in
which it is used it can provide improved performance over systems based
on integer factorization and discrete logarithms. The de-facto cryptographic
algorithm for digital signatures and encryption of symmetric keys is the
RSA. Although RSA is widely used and provides high security, there are
some potential problems with its use. In DSA, signature generation is faster
than signature verification, whereas with the RSA algorithm, signature
verification is very much faster than signature generation.
Digital Signature Schemes
Digital Signature schemes sign messages and verify the resulting
signature with two different keys in such a way that it is difficult to sign
without the signing key (Kaliski,  1993). Similar to public key
cryptosystems, the verification key can be published without
compromising security, and is called the public key; the signing key is
called the private key.
Digital signature schemes provide integrity and origin authentication.
Like public key cryptosystems, they do not require that parties first agree
on a secret key, and they are generally somewhat slower than, for instance,
secret-key cryptosystems and cryptographic hash functions.
RSA Digital Signatures
The RSA is based on the hard mathematical problem of integer factorization,
i.e., given a number that is the product of large prime numbers, factorize
the numbers to find the primes. RSA Digital signatures are generated by
performing the encryption of some clear text using one’s own private
key(Weise, 2001). This encryption allows one entity to send a message to
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need to first exchange secret or private cryptographic keys. The recipient
simply decrypts the message with the originator’s public key.
DSA Digital signatures
The DSA is based on the difficulty of computing discrete logarithms and is
based on schemes originally presented by ElGamal and Schnorr. There are
three parameters that are public and can be common to a group of users. A
160-bit prime number q is chosen. Next, a prime number p is selected with a
length between 512 and 1024 bits such that q divides (p-1). Finally, g is chosen
to be of the form h(p-1)/q mod p, where h is an integer between 1 and (p-1) with
the restriction that g must be greater than 1. With these numbers in hand, each
user selects a private key and generates a public key. The private key x must
be a number from 1 to (q-1) and should be chosen randomly or
pseudorandomly. The public key is calculated from the private key as y=gxmod
p. The calculation of y given x is relatively straight forward. However, given
the public key y, it is believed to be computationally infeasible to determine x,
which is the discrete logarithm of y to the base g, mod p.
Public Key Infrastructures
Public Key Infrastructures have been considered as an appropriate framework
for the provision of security services such as data confidentiality, integrity,
availability, authentication and non-repudiation in several business sectors.  A
PKI provides a foundation for other security services. The primary function of
a PKI is to allow the distribution and use of public keys and certificates with
security and integrity. In cryptography, a PKI is an arrangement that binds
public keys with respective user identities by means of a Certificate Authority
(CA).
Different business corporations deploy different types of PKIs such as
Single CA, Hierarchical, Bridge, Hybrid, and Mesh PKI(Adams and Farrell,
1999; Adams and Lloyd, 2003). In Hierarchical PKI, certificate path is
unidirectional, so certificate path development and validation is simple and
straight forward. However, if the root CA is compromised, which is everyone’s
trust point, the security of the whole system is collapsed. Mesh architecture
(also called Peer-to-Peer PKI or web of trust) is also widely used in applications
such as MANET(Serranoa et al., 2007), but certificate path development is
more complex than in a hierarchy. Unlike a hierarchy, building a certificate
path from a user’s certificate to a trust point is nondeterministic. The Bridge
Certification Authority (BCA) architecture was designed to address the
shortcomings of the above two basic PKI architectures, and to link PKIs that
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Since Hybrid PKI is the mixture of different PKI architectures(Pez  et al.,
2006), the complexity of certificate path verification is increased. The purpose
of this paper is to show the benefit of certificate path verification using forward
path construction method over reverse path construction method in Hierarchical
PKIs. We also propose a novel method to convert a Peer-to-Peer PKI to a
Depth First Search(DFS) spanning tree to simplify the certificate path verification
by avoiding multiple paths between users. The rest of the paper is organized
as follows:
In the paper, we introduce different types of PKI structures. Further the
certificate path verification in Hierarchical PKIs based on forward and reverse
path construction techniques is explained. Then the experimental results that
show the benefit of certificate path verification in Hierarchical PKIs using
forward path construction method over reverse path construction method in
terms of path verification time is shown. After this the proposed method of
converting a peer-to-peer PKI to its equivalent DFS spanning tree and its
advantages is explained. This is followed by the conclusions.
PKI STRUCTURES
The organization of PKI components in a PKI environment is called a PKI
structure or  a PKI architecture or a PKI trust model. Here we emphasize
only two PKI components, viz. Certificate Authorities and users or end
entities. Different business corporations deploy different types of PKI trust
models such as Single CA, Hierarchical, Bridge, Hybrid, and Mesh or Peer-
to-Peer PKI.
Single CA PKI model
As shown in Figure 1,  A Single CA PKI architecture is one that contains a
single CA and provides the PKI services for all the users or the end entities
(ENT1, ENT2, ENT3 and ENT4 in  Figure 1) of the PKI. There is a single
trust anchor that has to be trusted by all the users.
    CA 
 
ENT1 ENT2 ENT3 ENT4 
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Certificate path verification is very simple. In Single CA, PKI as all the
users are certified by the same CA. However, if the CA’s private key is
compromised, the security of the entire system collapses. Even though this
configuration is very easy to deploy, scalability is very poor if the
community of users is very large.
Hierarchical PKI model
A PKI constructed with superior-subordinate CA relationships is called a
Hierarchical PKI. In this type of PKI, as depicted in Figure 2, all of the
subscribers / relying parties trust a single CA. This CA is called the Root
CA (RCA in Figure 2) and is the most trusted anchor. The Root CA certifies
its immediate descendants, which in turn certify their descendants, and so
on. In this architecture, CAs issue certificates only for their lower level
CAs and end entities. Typically, only one superior CA certifies each CA.
Within this model, each participant must have knowledge of the Root CA’s
public key. Certificate path construction in a Hierarchical PKI is a
straightforward process that simply requires the relying party to successively
retrieve issuer certificates until a certificate is located that was issued by
the trusted root. Hierarchical PKIs are scalable; certification paths are easy
to develop and certification paths are relatively short(Koga and Sakurai,
2004). However, reliance on a single trust point may result in compromise
of the entire PKI.
Figure 2: Hierarchical PKI
Merged Hierarchical PKI with cross-certifications at the root
When two or more business corporations are collaborated, then merging
of their PKIs at the root level is a simple and straight forward approach.
This is the best solution when the interoperability among the PKIs is
temporary and  dynamically change with the market requirements. The
merging process needs to be low-cost, easily constructed and flexible. As
shown in the Figure 3, the merged PKI is still a strict hierarchical PKI and
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Figure 3: Merged Hierarchical PKIs with cross-certifications
However, this solution has the following drawbacks:
l It increases the cost  required to maintain the security of root CAs as
the merged PKI has more than one root CAs.
l The number of cross certifications is also more and it depends upon
the number of PKIs to be merged.
l The certificate path length is increased and the cost required to verify
the certificate is also more.
Mesh or Peer-to-Peer PKI model
A PKI constructed with peer-to-peer CA relationships is called a Mesh PKI
or a Peer-to-Peer PKI. It is also referred to as a “web of trust”(Saxena,
2004). In a mesh style PKI, as depicted in Figure 4, each subscriber trusts
its own CA. The CAs in this environment have no superior/ subordinate
relationship. Each CA issues certificate to and is issued by a peer CA.
Figure 4 depicts a mesh PKI that is fully cross-certified, however, it is
possible to construct and deploy a mesh PKI with a mixture of unidirectional
and cross-certifications(Lloyd et al., 2001). Compromise of a single CA
can not bring down the entire PKI. Mesh PKIs can easily incorporate a
community of users. However, certification path construction in a mesh
PKI is more complex than in a hierarchical PKI due to the likely existence
of multiple paths between a relying party’s trust anchor and the certificate
to be verified, and the potential for loops and cycles in non-hierarchical
certificate graphs.




Journal of Technology Management for Growing Economies, Volume 1, Number 1, April 2010
HYBRID PKI MODEL
Hybrid PKI is the interconnection of different PKIs via cross certification.
This enables relying parties of each to verify and accept certificates issued
by the other PKI(Pez and et al., 2006). If the interconnection is between
only hierarchical PKIs, Root CAs of all the participating PKIs cross certify
each other facilitating interoperability between PKIs.  Similarly, if the PKIs
are mesh style, then a CA within each PKI is selected, more or less
arbitrarily, to establish the cross certification. Usually the Federal PKI is
considered as the arbitrator. Within each PKI, a CA can be selected based
on the number of certificates issued. A CA with highest number of
certificates issued may be selected to establish the cross certification. This
results in the creation of a larger mesh PKI. However, the participating
PKIs need not be of the same type. Figure 5 depicts a hybrid situation
resulting from a hierarchical PKI cross-certifying a mesh PKI.
Figure 5: A Hybrid PKI
As the number of cross certified PKIs grows, the number of relationships
between them grows exponentially resulting in complex certificate path
verification.
BRIDGE PKI MODEL
Another approach to the interconnection of PKIs is the use of a “bridge”
certification authority (BCA). A BCA architecture was designed to address
the shortcoming of Hierarchical and Mesh PKIs(Adams and Lloyd, 2003).
A BCA connects multiple PKIs to establish trust paths among them. The
BCA is not intended to be used as a trust point by the users of the PKI. Its
main task is to establish trust relationships between local CAs. As shown
in the Figure 6, the BCA  cross-certifies with one CA (known as a “principal”
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Figure 6: Bridge PKI
Since each PKI only cross-certifies with one other entity (i.e., the BCA),
and the BCA cross-certifies only once with each participating PKI, the
number of relationships in this environment grows linearly with the number
of PKIs resulting in certification path discovery easier than mesh PKI.
However, this model has a centralized component, BCA. If it fails, all
cross-domain communication is unavailable. Also the certification path
discovery in Bridge PKI model is more difficult than Hierarchical PKI.
A TRUST MODEL BASED ON GATEWAY CAS
A gateway CA(GWCA)(Guo et al., 2005) is a CA that is designed so as to
allow certification to other different kinds of CA located anywhere in the
global trust network, hence perhaps in different sub-networks, down to
end entities (EE’s) in these sub-networks. The GWCAs for their respective
trust regions are connected in a ring fashion as shown in Figure 7. The
Gateway CAs are connected in a ring configuration with each other, the
intermediate and subordinate CAs may be connected in an hierarchical or
bridge configuration. In this model, the Gateway CAs are the most trusted
anchors.
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In this way, GWCA model provides a means of PKI interoperability in the
national and international levels.
CERTIFICATE PATH VERIFICATION IN HIERARCHICAL PKI
Digital Certificates
In automated business transactions, each user or end entity is given a
digitally signed data structure called digital certificate.  A digital
certificate(Saxena, 2004) is a digital credential that takes the following
form:
CS, I = Cert( n, S, I, sigi , pks, D, A)
where n is the serial number, I is the issuer of the certificate, S is the subject
of the certificate, sigi is the signature of the issuer I, pks is the public key of
S , D is the validity period of the certificate,  and A represents the additional
data. Digital certificates have emerged as a popular tool to provide
authentication, privacy, integrity, non-repudiation and other security
requirements in modern day transactions.
DIGITAL SIGNATURE GENERATION AND VERIFICATION
Digital signature generation and verification are important part of dealing
with digital certificates. Key generation (or update) time, signature time,
and verification time are all indicators of a signature scheme’s performance.
However, no one aspect alone is enough to judge whether one signature
scheme is better than another for all situations. Many earlier performance
comparisons take an informal approach at resolving this problem by first
looking at a specific situation and then picking which operation seems to
be most important for it (Wiener, 1998). This works well for simple
situations but does not help when it is unclear which operation is most
important or in seeing the entire picture with regards to performance
tradeoffs. It is very well known that for signature generation, DSA(Digital
Signature Algorithm) is faster than RSA(Rivest, Shamir and Adleman)
algorithm, where as for signature verification, RSA is faster than DSA
(Wiener,1998; Kaliski,1993).
Certificate Path
A Certificate path is an ordered sequence of digital certificates where the
subject of each certificate in the path is the issuer of the next certificate in
the path. A certificate path begins with a trust anchor certificate and ends
with an end entity certificate.
To describe the notation defined by X.509 to represent certificates, the
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in Figure 2 are initially assumed. ENT14 is an end entity certified by CA12,
and CA12 is directly subordinated to RCA in the hierarchy. Therefore, the
notation for the above path is represented as follows:
CA12 << ENT14 >> , RCA << CA12 >>
The processing of certificate paths may be a very complicated and time
demanding operation, depending on the length of the certificate path and
the possible inclusion of relations using cross-certification. Cross-certification
is required when users from different PKIs are to be able to trust each other’s
certificates.
Certificate Path Verification
Certificate Path Verification  is building  a trusted path between the trust
anchor certificate and the target entity certificate based on the trust relationship
among the CAs of the PKI and validating the certificates. The longer a path
becomes, the greater the potential dilution of trust in the certification path(M.
Cooper et al., 2005).  That is, with each successive link in the infrastructure
(i.e., certification by CAs and cross-certification between CAs) some amount
of assurance may be considered lost. The longer and more complicated a
path, the less likely it is to validate because of basic constraints, policies or
policy constraints, name constraints, Certificate Revocation List(CRL)
availability, or even revocation.
Issues in the Certificate Path Verification
The processing of a certificate path in order to verify its validity is composed
of two steps:
Path construction - the certificates are retrieved from a repository called
LDAP( Lightweight Directory Access Protocol) Directory(Boeyen et al.,
1999) and the path is constructed.
Path validation - the certificates in the path are checked for integrity, validity
period and information related to semantics verified.
The path discovery process is both computation and communication intensive,
since it involves discovering a chain of CAs in the path. The following factors
contribute to the complexity:
l There are many possible trust topologies as described in section 2. Among
these, the strict hierarchy of CAs offers the simplest form for path
discovery and validation. The mesh and bridge-CA topologies necessitate
the Relying Party(RP) software to be intelligent enough to navigate through
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decisions about the selection of links. Changes in the trust hierarchies
over time also necessitate changes in the relying party software.
l The trust policy issue is also a major concern during path validation.
Each RP has an acceptable trust policy for the chain of CAs that it is
trying to validate for a given certificate (Lloyd et al., 2001). The policy
would describe the minimum level of CA practices that it expects from
each of the CAs on the path.
l The response time is also one of the issues for certificate path validation.
An RP has to  respond quickly to its users for the service they request.
However, it cannot do so until the path construction and the subsequent
certificate validation are complete.
l The certificate repository availability is also an important concern to an
RP. All of the CAs and the relevant certificate and revocation information
repositories need to be available for an RP to discover and validate a
path. Data collection is a problem if a trust path is long, with several
CAs, as some entities along the path may not be accessible during
validation(Pinkas, 2001). In other words, even though a CA-CA certificate
is valid, due to the inability to access a CA’s data at the validation time,
an RP may not be able to validate a certificate.
l  The cost of path construction and validation should be minimum. The
task of path discovery and validation is an expensive process. Substantial
cost savings may not be realized if the entire process of validation is
repeated for each certificate that the RP receives, even when delegated
to a trusted validation server.
From the above discussion, it is clear that certificate validation is a complex
process involving considerable amount of communication and computational
overhead.
We can construct Certificate path in Hierarchical PKIs by two ways:
l Forward path construction in which the path is constructed from end
entity certificate to the trust anchor certificate.
The Forward certificate path construction is a straightforward approach
whereby we start constructing the path from target(end entity) certificate
to the root certificate via the intermediate CAs’ certificates. It is a
straightforward approach because the path is unidirectional and
unambiguous. Each certificate contains its issuer’s information and so it
is a simple task.
l Reverse path construction in which the path is constructed from trust
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Reverse path construction is not straightforward because it is difficult
to determine the exact path from Root CA to the target certificate
directly. To make a comparison between forward and reverse path
constructions, we adopt the child-sibling approach from(Huang, 2005)
to construct a binary tree, T ‘, from an arbitrary general tree, T,  so that
we can build the path without any ambiguity. In this child-sibling binary
tree representation, the first child from left of any internal node of T
becomes the left child of T ‘ and the next  node in the same level of T
becomes the right child of the previous node in T ‘. The link to the left
child node of the binary tree T ‘ is labeled with a bit 0 and the link to
the right child with a bit 1. Thus each CA node in the hierarchy holds
a codeword consisting of the accumulated 0-1 sequence from the root
to the target entity. Subordinate CAs get their codeword from their
parent CA.
In Figure 8, T is the input tree and T ‘ is the equivalent binary tree.
Figure 8: Conversion of Hierarchical Structure to a Binary Tree
In the binary tree T ‘, the left link is labeled with bit 0 and the right link
with bit 1. The number of ‘0’s in the codeword represents the level in the
tree. For example, the codeword of the node P in T ‘ is 0111010. Since the
depth of the nodes increases after transforming the general tree to a binary
tree, the path verification time also increases.
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Forward Vs. Reverse Certificate Path constructions in Hierarchical PKI
for Certificate Path Verification
We have implemented the methods of Forward and Reverse certificate
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that, the time required for certificate verification using Forward path
construction method is less than that of the Reverse path construction
method. This is because, using the reverse path construction method, the
depth of the nodes increases after transforming the general tree to the binary
tree.
Figure 9: Path Verification time with Forward and Reverse
Path Constructions
Proposed method of converting Peer-to-Peer PKI to DFS Spanning tree
to simplify certificate path verification
In automated business transactions, the method of building a trusted
path between the trusted anchor and the target entity constructs a path
as each certificate is retrieved from a repository via LDAP, a protocol
employed for repository access operations. The simplicity of such
method resides in the fact that only one certification path is possible
in the case of Hierarchical PKI. Also the path is unidirectional and
simple.
But, building a path in Peer-to-Peer PKI is nothing but traversing a
complex graph. However, from the simplest viewpoint, writing a path-
building module can be nothing more than traversal of a spanning tree,
even in a very complex cross-certified environment. In the proposed
method, we traverse the graph representing Peer-to-Peer PKI in Depth First
Search(DFS) order and construct a DFS spanning tree. In a DFS spanning
tree, we have a single path between any two users. We construct DFS
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Let graph G represent the Peer-to-Peer PKI in question. Each vertex in
the graph represents a CA. We shall start from a given vertex v in the
graph, G. We will mark this vertex v as visited. The next step is to pick a
new unvisited vertex(any one of the adjacent vertex can be selected). Call
this vertex w. We then explore this new vertex depending upon its adjacent
vertices recursively. The search procedure terminates after all the vertices




//G is a Graph representing Peer-to-Peer PKI. Each edge is
bidirectional
//Visited[1:n] is an array to remember the visited information
// v is the starting vertex
Visited[v]=1; //mark the starting vertex visited
Add v to the DFS spanning tree
for(each vertex w adjacent to v)
if(visited[w]=0)
Construct_DFSSpanningTree(w); //continue to explore
}
For example, Figure 10(a) is a graph that represents a Peer-to-Peer PKI in
which the path is bidirectional. The DFS order of the tree is: CA1, CA2,
CA3, CA6, CA4, CA5,  CA7.
Figure: 10(a) A Peer-to-Peer PKI    Figure: 10(b) DFS spanning tree
Figure 10(b) represents the DFS spanning tree of the graph shown in Figure
10(a). From Figure 10(b), we can observe that there exists single path
between any two CAs. Since there exists single path between any two CAs
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forward. The complexity due to multiple paths between CAs and ambiguity
in choosing one of them is removed.
CONCLUSIONS
In Hierarchical PKI, certificate path is unidirectional, so certificate path
development and validation is simple and straight forward. Certificate path
verification using forward path construction is the most popular technique
of building certificate path in Hierarchical PKIs. In this paper we have shown
that the time required to verify certificates using forward path construction
method is less than that of the path verification using reverse path construction
method in Hierarchical PKI. In mesh or Peer-to-Peer PKI, certificate path
verification is a complex task since there exist multiple paths between CAs.
In the paper, we proposed an efficient method to convert a mesh or Peer-to-
Peer PKI to its equivalent DFS spanning tree to simplify the certificate path
construction. Thus the complexity of certificate path verification in Peer-to-
Peer PKIs due to multiple paths between users can be removed.
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